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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
James Russell was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 
controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 846, and 
conducting a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. S 848. He was sentenced to two 
concurrent life terms. 
 
Russell's appeal presents a number of challenges to his 
convictions, the primary one being that the district court 
failed to instruct the jury properly on the CCE count. We 
will discuss each of Russell's challenges in turn, focusing in 
more detail on his claim that the CCE instruction deprived 
him of his Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury 
verdict. 
 
We will conclude that the jury instruction on the CCE 
count was erroneous and was not harmless error. 
Accordingly, we will reverse Russell's conviction under the 







Russell and four others were charged with conducting a 
continuing criminal enterprise (Count I), conspiracy to 
distribute controlled substances (Count II), and money 
laundering (Count III). The indictment also sought the 
forfeiture of property and assets obtained with proceeds of 
drug sales, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. S 853(p). App. at 53. 
Three of Russell's co-defendants, Mark Smith, Richard 
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Francis Robinson and Arthur Lester Raymond, pleaded 
guilty to the conspiracy charge and testified against Russell 
at trial. 
 
Russell's trial commenced in June 1995 and lasted 
approximately six weeks. The testimony outlined a complex 
and lucrative scheme, organized by Russell, to distribute 
drugs in Pennsylvania, initially in Philadelphia and later in 
Williamsport. Essentially, Russell, Robinson, Smith and 
Raymond pooled their funds to make large purchases of 
cocaine base and cocaine powder from suppliers in New 
York. The drugs were repackaged and distributed to sellers 
in Pennsylvania, and then sold on the street in $10 or $20 
bags. 
 
In addition to conducting his own distribution network in 
Williamsport, Russell also supplied cocaine to other 
distributors operating networks there. Specifically, Russell 
developed a business relationship with one David Williams. 
Russell would supply Williams with cocaine, which Williams 
would then sell from a location known as the "pink house." 
Over time, Williams permitted Russell to sell cocaine 
directly out of the "pink house." Russell's co-conspirators 
were not permitted to sell drugs out of this location. 
 
B. Weapons Use 
 
Testimony at trial also revealed that between 1990 and 
1994, Russell had his girlfriend, Melita Garcia, purchase a 
number of guns for him. Garcia testified that she 
purchased the weapons with cash given to her by Russell. 
Although there was no testimony relating to Russell's 
specific use of the guns during particular drug 
transactions, the government introduced evidence, over 
Russell's objection, pertaining to Russell's arrest in 1991 in 
Maple Shade, New Jersey. At the time of the arrest, Russell 
was traveling with Mark Smith from New York where they 
had purchased cocaine from one of Russell's sources. When 
the car was stopped, the police discovered a gun in the 
trunk, together with 473 grams of cocaine and packaging 
material. Russell pleaded guilty to the gun charge and was 
released for time served. 
 
Another witness, Andre Grimes, testified that in another 
incident relating to the drug operation, Russell used a knife 
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to assault George Felder. Grimes testified that in October 
1994, he and Russell assaulted Felder because Felder had 
allegedly stolen approximately $400 to $500 in drug 
proceeds belonging to Russell. App. at 383-85. Grimes 
explained that when he and Russell approached Felder 
about the stolen money, Felder had a knife. App. at 385. 
Grimes testified that he felt threatened, picked up a bat 
and started hitting Felder with it. Id. He further testified 
that when Felder dropped the knife, Russell picked it up 
and "started slicing him with it." Id. at 386. On the basis of 
this testimony, the court assessed a two-level increase to 
Russell's base offense level for possessing a dangerous 
weapon during the course of the offense, pursuant to 




To compute Russell's offense level under the Sentencing 
Guidelines, the district court held a hearing concerning the 
quantity of drugs attributable to him. Ultimately, the court 
concluded that the quantity of drugs for which Russell was 
responsible could not be discerned from the trial testimony, 
and that "[t]he best estimate available to the court of a drug 
quantity for which Russell is responsible is found in the 
stipulations regarding drug quantity to which Russell's co- 
conspirators entered after pleading guilty to conspiring with 
Russell." App. at 137. Because Russell's co-conspirators 
stipulated that they were responsible for quantities not 
exceeding 20 kilograms of powder cocaine and 250 grams 
of cocaine base, the court determined that Russell was 
responsible for the same amount. Thus, the court assessed 
Russell's base offense level, under S 2D1.5(a)(1), at 38. With 
the two-level increase for possession of a firearm and a two- 
level increase for obstruction of justice, Russell's resulting 
offense level was 42. Applied to his criminal history 
category of II, his resulting imprisonment range under the 
Sentencing Guidelines was 360 months to life. 
 
Russell appeals the conviction and sentence entered by 
the district court. The district court had jurisdiction under 
18 U.S.C. S 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
S 1291. 
 




A. The CCE Statute & Specific Unanimity 
 
The CCE statute under which Russell was convicted 
requires that the government prove the following elements: 
(1) that the defendant committed a drug-related felony 
under U.S.C. Title 21, Chapter 13, subchapter I or II; (2) 
that this violation was part of a "continuing series of 
violations" of the subchapter; (3) that the defendant acted 
as an organizer, supervisor or manager of five or more other 
persons in committing this series of violations; and (4) that 
the defendant obtained "substantial income or resources" 
from such activities. 21 U.S.C. S 848. 
 
At issue here is the second element, which requires proof 
that "such violation is a part of a continuing series of 
violations." Id. With respect to this issue, the trial judge 
instructed the jury as follows: 
 
       The phrase, a continuing series of violations means 
       three or more violations of the federal narcotics laws 
       which are in some way -- laws which are in some way 
       related to each other. In order to find that this element 
       has been established, you must unanimously agree 
       that the Defendant, Mr. Russell, participated in at least 
       three or more violations of the federal narcotics laws 
       which are in some way related to each other 
 
App. at 2094. Russell claims that the district court's 
instruction failed to advise the jury of the requirement that 
they unanimously agree as to the identity of the three 
related drug offenses constituting the criminal enterprise. 
Appellant's Br. at 27. At trial the government introduced 
substantial evidence of Russell's drug-related activity. But 
Russell claims that the general unanimity instruction 
permitted the jury to convict him so long as each juror was 
convinced that he had committed a series comprised of any 
three related drug violations, regardless of whether they 
unanimously agreed as to the identity of each underlying 
violation. See, e.g., United States v. Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810, 
814 (3d Cir. 1996) ("For example, six jurors may have felt 
that violations A, B, and C (but no others) were related, and 
the other six jurors may have concluded that violations D, 
E, and F (but no others) were related."). 
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While it is true that in most cases a general unanimity 
instruction is sufficient to support a conviction, see United 
States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 1987), a specific 
unanimity instruction is required "where the complexity of 
the case, or other factors, creates the potential that the jury 
will be confused." Id.; cf. United States v. Ryan, 828 F.2d 
1010, 1020 (3d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, United States 
v. Wells, 117 S. Ct. 921 (1997) ("[I]n any case where a 
count will be submitted to the jury on alternative theories, 
prudence counsels the trial court to give an augmented 
unanimity instruction if the defendant requests such a 
charge. Unanimity is an indispensable element of a federal 
jury trial.") (internal citation omitted). The purpose of a 
specific unanimity instruction is to ensure that the jurors 
are "in substantial agreement as to just what a defendant 
did as a step preliminary to determining whether the 
defendant is guilty of the crime charged." Beros, 833 F.2d 
at 460 (quoting United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 457- 
58 (5th Cir. 1977)). 
 
In Edmonds, we had to decide whether jury instructions 
relating to a charge under the CCE statute must direct the 
jury to agree unanimously on which of the alleged 
violations constitute the continuing series required by the 
statute. We held that a general unanimity instruction was 
insufficient to support a conviction under the CCE statute, 
concluding that the statute "requires unanimous agreement 
as to the identity of each of the three related offenses 
comprising the continuing series."1  Edmonds, 80 F.3d at 
822 (emphasis added). Our decision in Edmonds was rooted 
in the principle that a federal defendant in a criminal trial 
has a constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict. Id. 
at 823 ("[T]he district court's failure to give . . . [the] 
proposed specific unanimity instruction was error . . . 
implicat[ing] Edmonds's Sixth Amendment right to a 
unanimous verdict in a federal criminal trial."); see also, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638 (3d Cir. 1988), we held 
that a jury considering a CCE charge must unanimously agree on which 
three acts constitute the continuing series of violations. In Edmonds, 
sitting en banc, we explicitly recognized "the opportunity to reconsider 
Echeverri" and reaffirmed the decision reached in that case. 80 F.3d at 
812. 
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Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948) 
("Unanimity in jury verdicts is required where the Sixth and 
Seventh Amendments apply."); Beros, 833 F.2d at 461 
("[J]ust as the sixth amendment requires jury unanimity in 
federal criminal cases on each delineated offense that it 
finds a defendant culpable, it must also require unanimity 
regarding the specific act or acts which constitutes that 
offense.") (internal citation omitted). 
 
The jury instruction at issue in this case is 
constitutionally deficient in the same manner as was the 
instruction in Edmonds. In Edmonds, the trial court 
instructed the jury as follows: 
 
       The government has to prove [ ] that such violation was 
       part of a continuing series of related violations of the 
       federal narcotics laws. A continuing series of violations 
       requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that three or 
       more violations of the laws occurred and that they, 
       those three or more, were related to each other. 
 
80 F.3d at 813. Although Russell's jury was instructed that 
they must "unanimously agree" that he "participated in at 
least three or more violations of the federal narcotics laws," 
App. at 2094, this charge still amounted to a general, not 
a specific, unanimity instruction. The jury should have 
been instructed that unanimous agreement was required 
not only to find the existence of a continuing series, but in 
determining the composition of that series. Our holding in 
Edmonds was clear: "[t]he CCE statute requires unanimous 
agreement as to the identity of each of the three related 
offenses comprising the continuing series." Edmonds, 80 
F.3d at 822 (emphasis added); see also Gipson, 553 F.2d at 
456-57 ("The unanimity rule . . . requires jurors to be in 
substantial agreement as to just what a defendant did as a 
step preliminary to determining whether the defendant is 
guilty of the crime charged.") 
 
To be sure, the government introduced compelling 
evidence that Russell had, in fact, engaged in a large 
number of drug-related transactions, any number of which 
could have been the basis for an individual juror's 
determination that he had participated in a continuing 
series of violations under the CCE statute. But the 
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instruction given by the district judge permitted the jurors 
to convict on the CCE count even if different jurors 
determined that Russell had committed different acts. 
Although the jurors may, in fact, have unanimously agreed 
on a particular set of predicate acts, we cannot speculate as 
to the content of the jury's deliberations. See United States 
v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 461 (3d Cir. 1987) (" `[W]e are not 
free to hypothesize whether the jury indeed agreed to and 
was clear on the' transaction or theory by which it found 
[the defendant] guilty.") (quoting United States v. Echeverry, 
698 F.2d 375, modified, 719 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1983) (en 
banc)). Thus, because the jurors may well have agreed that 
a continuing series of violations had occurred, yet disagreed 
as to the identity of the three related offenses comprising 
the series, we conclude that the district court's failure to 
give a specific unanimity charge violated Russell's Sixth 
Amendment right to a unanimous verdict.2  
 
B. Standard of Review 
 
1. Preservation of Issue for Appeal 
 
Though we have concluded that the charge on the CCE 
continuing series element was error, we must nevertheless 
determine whether it constituted reversible error. The 
government argues, and the dissent agrees, that Russell 
failed to preserve this issue, and thus the standard of 
review is plain error. For the following reasons, we believe 
that the issue was properly preserved, and therefore review 
for harmless error. 
 




2. We do not suggest that in addition to a specific unanimity charge, a 
special verdict form must be submitted to the jury requiring it to 
enumerate the specific predicate acts which it has determined constitute 
the continuing series. Nor do we believe it appropriate to prescribe 
specific language to be used when charging a jury with respect to the 
continuing series element of a CCE count. Just how the goal of ensuring 
unanimous agreement is better left to the insight and experience of 
district court judges on a case by case basis. We merely reaffirm our 
holding in Edmonds that the jury be instructed to reach unanimous 
agreement on the identity of the offenses constituting the continuing 
series. 
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       No party may assign as error any portion of the charge 
       or omission therefrom unless that party objects thereto 
       before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating 
       distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the 
       grounds of the objection. 
 
The purpose of this provision is to allow the district court 
an opportunity to correct potential problems in jury 
instructions before the jury begins its deliberations. See 
United States v. Logan, 717 F.2d 84, 91 (3d Cir. 1983) 
("Rule 30 has the manifest purpose of avoiding whenever 
possible the necessity of a time-consuming new trial by 
providing the trial judge with an opportunity to correct any 
mistakes in the charge before the jury begins to 
deliberate.") (internal citation omitted). 
 
The trial record in this case discloses the following 
sequence of events with respect to the charge. First, the 
judge gave a CCE charge which did not require specific 
unanimity with respect to the continuing series of offenses. 
App. at 2091-99. Next, the judge stated that the he would 
meet with counsel to "find out any objections or exceptions 
to the charge," and dismissed the jury for lunch. App. at 
2141. During the ensuing conference, the prosecutor and 
defense counsel engaged in a discussion concerning the 
applicability of the Edmonds case. Russell's counsel argued 
that a special verdict was required by Edmonds. The 
government argued that the instruction as given was 
consistent with Edmonds. App. at 2145. The court then 
stated that it would consider the issue during the lunch 
break, App. at 2145, but the issue was not revisited. 
 
Although Russell's counsel did not explicitly state that he 
was objecting to the CCE instruction,3  the colloquy between 
the court and counsel regarding the Edmonds case, and the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Defense counsel made the following statement to the judge: 
 
       [Y]ou asked about the form, the form of the verdict and whether I 
       thought that there was any change that needed to be made. I was 
       attempting to point out that my interpretation of[Edmonds] seems 
       to suggest that there is a need for a special verdict page that 
       requires the jury to fill in three blank lines of which three 
federal 
       felony offenses that have unanimously agreed upon having been 
       committed by the defendant. 
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context in which this conversation took place (an on-the- 
record conference to discuss objections and exceptions to 
the charge), lead us to conclude that the trial judge had 
sufficient notice of a possible error in the CCE jury 
instruction. As we noted earlier, the crux of Rule 30 is that 
the district court be given notice of potential errors in the 
jury instructions, not that a party be "required to adhere to 
any formalities of language and style to preserve his 
objection on the record." United States v. O'Neill, 116 F.3d 
245, 247 (7th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted).4 
Russell's trial counsel alerted the court to his belief that the 
charge as given did not comply with our decision in 
Edmonds, and the judge's statement that he would review 
the issue suggests that the court understood this as an 
objection (or at the very least, a point of disagreement with 
the charge as given). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. To the extent this sentiment has been expressed even more clearly in 
the civil context, it serves to further demonstrate why the dissent relies 
upon an overly formalistic interpretation of Rule 30 and its 
requirements. Interpretations of Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the civil analog to Rule 30, indicate that formal objections 
are 
not required. See, e.g., Larry V. Muko, Inc. v. Southwestern Pennsylvania 
Bldg. and Const. Trades Council, 670 F.2d 421, 425 (3d Cir. 1982) (issue 
preserved for appeal where the party "may not have formally objected to 
the jury charge, [but] it is clear from the record that the judge was made 
aware of [the party's] position before the jury retired to consider its 
verdict") (internal citation omitted); Kroger Co. v. Roadrunner Transp., 
Inc., 634 F.2d 228, 230 (5th Cir. 1980) ("The Rule does not require 
formality, and it is not important in what form an objection is made or 
even that a formal objection is made at all, as long as it is clear that 
the 
trial judge understood the party's position . . . The purpose of the Rule 
is to inform the trial judge of possible errors so that he may have an 
opportunity to correct them.") (emphasis added) (internal citation 
omitted). The dissent relies heavily upon Rule 30's admonition that a 
party state "distinctly the matter to which th[e] party objects and the 
grounds of the objection." This language is virtually identical to that in 
Rule 51 which states that a party must "state distinctly the matter 
objected to and the grounds of the objection." Thus, while we agree with 
Judge Alito's statement that Rule 30 "is a vitally important rule," we 
also 
believe it would be nonsensical not to furnish criminal defendants with 
the same flexible, common-sense interpreation we afford litigants in the 
civil context. 
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Certainly, an objection must be specific enough not only 
to put the judge on notice that there is in fact an objection, 
but to serve notice as to the underlying basis for the 
objection. United States v. Sandini, 803 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 
1986). For example, in Sandini we determined that the 
substance of a colloquy between the judge and defense 
counsel was insufficient to have put the trial judge on 
notice that an objection was based on Rule 404(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, because defense counsel simply 
repeated three times that the information was "irrelevant." 
803 F.2d at 126. Here, however, the trial court was put on 
notice that Russell believed that the instruction was 
incorrect because it lacked the requisite specificity, and 
that the basis for this belief was our decision in Edmonds.5 
 
Finally, the context in which the colloquy between the 
court and the attorneys took place provides an additional 
basis for concluding that a proper objection was made. The 
judge convened this on-the-record meeting specifically to 
"find out any objections or exceptions to the charge." App. 
at 2141. This is, of course, a common practice in both 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We do not share the dissent's concern that during the colloquy, 
Russell's counsel argued that Edmonds required a special verdict form, 
see note 4, a position we have refused to adopt in this case. The dissent 
urges that we have committed a "serious error" by obscuring the 
distinction between an objection to a jury instruction and a request for 
a special verdict sheet, but we have done no such thing. To be clear, the 
only relevance we have placed on the defendant's request for a special 
verdict sheet is that it put the judge on notice that specific unanimity 
was needed. True, Russell's counsel, in requesting a special verdict form, 
may have overemphasized what Edmonds required. But it is undeniable 
that his remarks were sufficient to put the trial court on notice that, at 
the very least, he did not believe that the charge as given was in 
compliance with our holding in Edmonds. See United States v. Rosero, 42 
F.3d 166, 173 (3d Cir. 1994) (Although alternative instruction advanced 
by defendant "was also erroneous," defense counsel, in objecting to 
court's charge, provided a clear explanation as to why the instruction 
was erroneous and therefore "preserved valid objections to the erroneous 
portion of the instructions.") Specifically, defense counsel called the 
judge's attention to the relevant language in Edmonds, which the judge 
indicated he would read. Ultimately, it was for the court to determine 
whether Edmonds required a special verdict form or simply a specific 
unanimity instruction. No such determination was ever made. 
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criminal and civil trials and serves as an invitation to 
counsel to suggest corrections or amendments to the 
charge, or to state or reiterate objections. Defense counsel 
took this opportunity to engage the court and prosecutor in 
an extended debate about whether or not the jury 
instruction at issue was consistent with Edmonds. We 
believe the court must have understood that Russell's 
counsel was stating an objection to the charge as given; 
thus, this issue was properly preserved for our review.6 
 
2. Proposed Alternative Instruction 
 
In addition to posing his objection, Russell's counsel 
proposed an alternative jury instruction, one which 
required specific unanimity as to the series of offenses 
under the CCE count. In our view, this constitutes an 
additional ground for applying a harmless error standard in 
this case.7 
 
The failure to give the defendant's proposed jury 
instruction formed the primary basis for our decision in 
Edmonds. While our holding was certainly premised upon 
our discussion as to whether the court's charge was 
sufficient to assure jury unanimity, our primary focus was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The dissent also urges that because Russell's counsel objected to 
instructions 51 and 43 (neither of which had anything to do with 
Edmonds), but failed to object to the general unanimity instruction at 
the same time, the issue was not preserved. However, as we have noted, 
Russell's counsel believed that a special verdict form was required by 
Edmonds. This belief, while incorrect, was not unreasonable. At the time 
Russell's counsel specifically objected to jury instructions 51 and 43, he 
did not know that the judge would not be using his proposed special 
verdict form. Although a special verdict form is not required, from the 
perspective of Russell's counsel a general unanimity instruction coupled 
with a special verdict form would have assured specific unanimity. 
Therefore, defense counsel had no reason to object to the unanimity 
instruction until the judge had ruled on his request for a special 
verdict. 
Again, the underlying purpose of Rule 30 is to put the judge on notice 
as to potential errors. Here, as we discussed above, we believe the judge 
was put on notice of an Edmonds problem. 
 
7. Defendant's proposed jury instruction Number 41 stated in pertinent 
part that "[y]ou as a jury, must agree unanimously on the three acts 
which constitute the continuing series of Federal Drug Law violations." 
Appellee's Supplemental Appendix at 25. 
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whether "the court's failure to give [the defendant's] 
proposed specific unanimity instruction" constituted error. 
Edmonds, 80 F.3d at 823. 
 
Although it is unclear that proposing an alternative jury 
instruction is itself sufficient to preserve the issue for 
appeal, at least two of our cases have indicated that the 
plain error standard will be applied when there has been no 
specific objection to the charge as given and no alternative 
jury instruction has been submitted. See, e.g., Beros, 833 
F.2d at 458 ("review under the more deferential`plain error' 
standard is appropriate in cases where no objection to jury 
instructions is made, or where no alternative jury 
instructions are proposed") (internal citations omitted); 
United States v. DeCarlo, 458 F.2d 358, 370 (3d Cir. 1972) 
(plain error analysis is applied "[i]n the absence of an 
alternative request or specific objection" to the charge). 
Other circuits have employed this analysis as well. See, 
e.g., United States v. Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 834 (9th Cir. 
1986) (Where defendant "did not request a specific 
unanimity instruction and failed to object to the court's 
instructions as given" appellate court will review for plain 
error.); United States v. Donathan, 65 F.3d 537, 540 (6th 
Cir. 1995) ("Since defendant neither requested nor 
submitted [an alternative] instruction, and did not object to 
the instructions given by the trial judge, the jury 
instructions are reviewable only for plain error."). However, 
at least two circuits have indicated that proposing an 
alternative jury instruction, without more, is insufficient to 
preserve the issue. See United States v. Tannenbaum, 934 
F.2d 8, 14 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[R]equested instructions do not 
substitute for specific objections to the court's 
instructions.") (quoting United States v. Graziano, 710 F.2d 
691, 696 n.8 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 
Because we hold that the colloquy between the district 
judge and trial counsel was tantamount to an objection and 
therefore sufficient to preserve this issue for our review, we 
need not determine here whether or not proposing an 
alternative instruction would be sufficient in and of itself to 
avoid a plain error standard of review. However, under the 
facts of this case, where defense counsel not only proposed 
an alternative jury instruction but engaged the court and 
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prosecutor in a colloquy regarding an alleged error in the 
charge, the issue was sufficiently preserved to invoke a 
harmless error analysis. 
 
3. Plain Error Analysis 
 
We have concluded that the appropriate standard of 
review in this case is harmless error. The government took 
the position at oral argument that the appropriate standard 
is plain error. The dissent agrees. Ultimately, however, we 
believe the jury charge constituted reversible error even 
under the more deferential plain error standard. 
 
For there to be plain error, there must be an "error" that 
is "plain" and that "affects substantial rights." United States 
v. Retos, 25 F.3d 1220, 1228 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting United 
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)). A deviation from a 
legal rule is "error." Id. at 733. A "plain" error is one which 
is "clear" or "obvious." Id. at 734. In this case the court 
erred when it "deviated from the legal rule" that jurors must 
be instructed as to the requirement of specific unanimity 
to find a continuing series under the CCE statute. 
Furthermore, the error was plain in that it was "clear" and 
"obvious" from even a cursory reading of our decision in 
Edmonds that a finding of specific unanimity was required 
to sustain a CCE conviction. Edmonds, 80 F.3d at 822; see 
also United States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909, 920 (3d Cir. 
1996) (omission of essential element of offense from jury 
instructions "usually will be obvious error," therefore 
satisfying the requirements that there be "error" and that 
the error be "plain"). 
 
Having determined that the error was plain, we must now 
examine whether the error "affected substantial rights," 
thus constituting reversible error under plain error review. 
See Retos, 25 F.3d at 1228. We have no hesitation in 
concluding that the error did affect a substantial right of 
Mr. Russell -- his constitutional right to a unanimous jury 
verdict on each element of the CCE charge. The Supreme 
Court has held that due process requires "proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which [the defendant] is charged." United States 
v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1287 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). See Government of 
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Virgin Islands v. Brown, 685 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1982) ("The 
omission of an essential element of an offense in the charge 
to the jury ordinarily constitutes plain error.") At least one 
other circuit has found plain error under circumstances 
similar to those presented here. See United States v. 
Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 836-37 (9th Cir. 1986) (after trial 
court gave a general unanimity instruction, the reviewing 
court found that there was a genuine possibility that the 
jurors were not unanimous as to which of the charged 
offenses supported the verdict, and held that the failure to 
give a specific unanimity instruction therefore constituted 
plain error). 
 
C. Harmless Error Analysis 
 
Under a harmless error review, if we find a constitutional 
error, we may affirm the district court "only if the error is 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. 
Molina-Guevara, 96 F.3d 698, 703 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Under the 
facts of this case, we cannot conclude that the error in the 
charge to the jury was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and therefore must reverse. 
 
Although the government introduced a vast array of 
evidence regarding Russell's drug-related activity, and the 
jury determined that Russell was engaged in a continuing 
series of violations, as we discussed above, it is impossible 
to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury 
reached unanimous agreement as to which specific 
violations occurred. Therefore, we can only conclude that 
Russell was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a 
unanimous jury verdict. See, e.g., Beros, 833 F.2d at 463 
("Because there is a significant possibility that this error 
may have resulted in a non-unanimous verdict in violation 
of the Sixth Amendment, the district court's instructions 
were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."). Despite 
the enormous volume of evidence introduced against 
Russell, "we cannot affirm a non-unanimous verdict simply 
because the evidence is so overwhelming that the jury 
surely would have been unanimous had it been properly 
instructed on unanimity." Edmonds, 80 F.3d at 824. 
 
In Edmonds we ultimately determined that the failure of 
the court to provide a specific unanimity instruction was 
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harmless error. But the facts which formed the basis for 
that conclusion are not present in this case. In Edmonds, 
the defendant was convicted of every violation alleged to 
constitute the continuing series for the CCE charge. 
Edmonds, 80 F.3d at 812-13. We did not have to speculate 
whether the jurors reached agreement as to the identity of 
each of the three offenses constituting the series, because 
we had a jury verdict which demonstrated that each juror 
believed the defendant to be guilty of all of the violations 
constituting the series. 
 
Russell, on the other hand, was not charged separately 
with all of the underlying offenses which, according to the 
government, constituted the continuing series for the CCE 
count.8 Although he was convicted of conspiracy to 
distribute controlled substances, and the government has 
urged that this is the "functional equivalent" of a finding of 
unanimity on the continuing criminal enterprise charge, 
Appellee's Br. at 34-35, we cannot agree. The jury returned 
a unanimous verdict on the conspiracy charge, but we can 
only conclude from this that the jury agreed that Russell 
was guilty of that one predicate offense. 
 
The CCE statute requires that the defendant participate 
in a "continuing series" of violations of the federal drug 
laws. 21 U.S.C. S 848. We have held that a"continuing 
series" consists of three or more separate violations. 
Echeverri, 854 F.2d at 643. A jury finding that the 
defendant was guilty of a single predicate act cannot be the 
"functional equivalent" of a jury finding that the defendant 
participated in a continuing series of three violations. It is 
on this basis that we hold that the district court's failure to 
instruct the jury as to the requirement of specific 
unanimity for the continuing series element did not amount 
to harmless error. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Although Russell was charged with multiple counts, only the count of 
conspiracy to distribute controlled substances under 21 U.S.C. S 846 
could qualify as a CCE predicate act, because the CCE statute expressly 
requires that the violations constituting the continuing series be of 
U.S.C. Title 21, Chapter 13, subchapter I or II. 21 U.S.C. S 848. 
 




In summary, we hold that the jury instruction at issue 
was erroneous because it failed to apprise the jury of their 
responsibility to unanimously agree on the identity of the 
three predicate violations constituting the continuing series 
required for a CCE conviction. Furthermore, the failure to 
give a proper unanimity instruction constitutes reversible 
error under either a harmless error or plain error standard 
of review. Accordingly, we will reverse the defendant's 




Russell has raised a number of other challenges to his 
conviction, none of which has merit. We will discuss each 
of them in turn. 
 
A. Alleged Evidence of Multiple Conspiracies  
 
Russell contends that his rights were prejudiced by the 
admission of evidence of multiple conspiracies at variance 
with the single conspiracy alleged in the indictment. 
Specifically, Russell maintains that evidence relating to his 
activity at the "pink house" and drug activity in 
Philadelphia illustrate the existence of two other 
conspiracies separate from the Williamsport conspiracy 
charged in the indictment. Russell argues that he has been 
prejudiced because this evidence permitted the jury"to 
consider offenses unrelated to the Williamsport conspiracy 
when determining [his] guilt on the conspiracy count." See 
Appellant's Br. at 30-38. We disagree. Russell has not been 
prejudiced because the evidence offered by the government 
supports the finding of a single conspiracy encompassing 
the drug activities in Williamsport, Philadelphia and the 
"pink house." 
 
To determine whether a series of events constitutes a 
single conspiracy or separate, unrelated conspiracies, a 
three-step inquiry is required: (1) determining whether 
there was a common goal among the conspirators; (2) 
examining the nature of the scheme and determining 
whether the agreement sought to bring about a continuous 
result which could not be sustained without the continued 
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cooperation of the conspirators; and (3) examining the 
extent to which the participants overlapped in various 
dealings. United States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 
1989). Clearly, the common goal of this conspiracy was to 
make money selling cocaine. After applying the Kelly 
factors, it seems obvious that virtually all activities the co- 
conspirators engaged in to make money selling cocaine 
could be encompassed within this single conspiracy. A 
conspiracy charge often casts a wide net, and drug 
distribution activities conducted in different locations can 
certainly be encompassed within a single conspiracy. Nor 
are we concerned that only Russell, not his co-conspirators, 
sold drugs out of the "pink house." Co-conspirators do not 
have to know all of the details, goals or even the identity of 
other co-conspirators, to support the finding of a single 
conspiracy. Id. at 260. We therefore affirm the jury's verdict 
on the conspiracy count. 
 
B. Admission of Evidence Relating to Maple Shade 
       Arrest and Handgun Purchases 
 
Russell challenges the admission of evidence relating to 
his arrest in 1991 in Maple Shade, New Jersey. He also 
challenges the evidence introduced pertaining to several 
handgun purchases made on his behalf by Melita Garcia, 
his girlfriend. Russell maintains that the events 
surrounding the arrest were not relevant to the issues to be 
decided by the jury because they occurred in April 1991, 
one year prior to the beginning of the conspiracy alleged in 
the indictment. He challenges the evidence of handgun 
purchases on the basis that: (1) there was no evidence 
presented that he actually possessed the guns; and 
(2) three purchases occurred prior to the April 1992 date 
cited in the indictment as the beginning of the conspiracy. 
 
The events relating to the Maple Shade arrest were 
relevant at trial to show a common scheme or plan in 
relation to the conspiracy alleged in the indictment. The 
evidence at trial established that Russell and Smith were 
arrested in Maple Shade on their way from New York where 
they had purchased cocaine from one of Russell's sources. 
App. at 1272. This same source was later used by Russell 
to purchase drugs for his Williamsport operation. From 
these events, a jury could reasonably infer a common 
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scheme or plan similar to that operated by Russell in 
Williamsport and in which Smith participated. The evidence 
was probative to establish an association between Smith 
and Russell, to establish how the drug operation functioned 
(i.e., drugs supplied from New York), and to establish a 
common purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya-Ortiz, 
7 F.3d 1171, 1177-78 (5th Cir. 1993) (jury could consider 
prior conduct to determine that conduct charged was not 
"coincidence, accident, or mistake, but was instead a part 
of [a scheme] in furtherance of " a particular goal or 
purpose); United States v. Fitzherbert, 13 F.3d 340, 343 
(10th Cir. 1993) (evidence of prior marijuana operation 
admissible to establish "knowledge, intent, and the 
presence of a common scheme or plan."). 
 
Russell's challenge to the admission of evidence relating 
to his gun purchases is equally unpersuasive. Russell 
contends that the evidence was not relevant because there 
was no evidence presented relating to his use or possession 
of the guns. In our view, the jurors could have reasonably 
concluded that he possessed the guns which were, after all, 
purchased for him. Furthermore, it has long been 
recognized that firearms are relevant evidence in the 
prosecution of drug-related offenses, because guns are tools 
of the drug trade. United States v. Muniz, 60 F.3d 65, 71 
(2d Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 
1099, 1109 (3d Cir. 1985) (gun possession probative as to 
scale of conspiracy and type of protection conspirators 
believed was necessary to protect their operation). Finally, 
Russell contends that because three of the gun purchases 
occurred prior to the date cited in the indictment as the 
beginning of the conspiracy, these purchases cannot be 
relevant. We disagree. The jury reasonably could have 
concluded that gun purchases completed prior to the 
beginning of the drug conspiracy were made with the 
anticipation that he would need "protection" to establish his 
drug operation. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district 
court's admission of evidence regarding the defendant's 
Maple Shade arrest and gun purchases was not an abuse 
of discretion. 
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C. Two-Level Increase in Offense Level for Weapons 
       Possession 
 
The district court imposed a two-level increase in 
Russell's offense level for possessing a dangerous weapon 
pursuant to S 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines. The 
facts which formed the basis for this increase were 
Russell's possession of the knife used to assault George 
Felder in October 1994, and Russell's possession of two 
guns, purchased by Melita Garcia. Russell maintains that 
he used the knife in self-defense and argues that this is not 
the type of possession contemplated by the Sentencing 
Guidelines to warrant a two-level increase. We find this 
argument unpersuasive. 
 
The Sentencing Guidelines provide that the two-level 
adjustment should be applied "if the weapon was present, 
unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was 
connected with the offense." U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1, comment. 
(n.3). The testimony relating to the knife assault 
unequivocally established that the confrontation between 
Russell and Felder involved a dispute about proceeds 
generated from drug activity. Under such circumstances, 
we cannot conclude that it was "improbable" that the knife 
was connected with the offense. Moreover, inasmuch as we 
believe that the district court's imposition of the two-level 
increase on this basis was proper, we need not determine 
whether an adjustment would have been appropriate under 
a gun possession theory. 
 
D. Use of Stipulations To Establish Drug Quantity 
 
To sentence a defendant on a drug-related charge, the 
district court must determine the quantity of drugs for 
which the defendant was responsible. After reviewing the 
record from Russell's trial, however, the district court 
concluded that the quantity of drugs for which Russell was 
responsible could not be discerned from the trial testimony. 
In order to ascertain a quantity that could be attributed to 
Russell's drug conspiracy and continuing criminal 
enterprise, the court relied on stipulations agreed to 
between the government and Russell's co-conspirators, 
stating that they "form[ed] a highly reliable basis for an 
estimate of the drugs attributable to Russell." App. at 134. 
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The district court sentenced Russell based on the same 
quantity of drugs his co-conspirators stipulated to, 20 
kilograms of powder cocaine and 250 grams of cocaine 
base. Russell objects to the district court's method, urging 
that it is an unreliable measure of the amount of drugs for 
which he was accountable. 
 
We are unpersuaded by Russell's argument. First, 
Russell was the organizer of the conspiracy. We believe that 
the quantity of drugs for which his co-conspirators have 
taken responsibility provides a reliable basis for estimating 
the quantity of drugs attributable to him. Second, even if 
the estimate was unreliable, it was overgenerous to Russell. 
The evidence at trial showed that because of his operation 
at the "pink house," Russell actually participated in a 
greater number of drug transactions than did his co- 
conspirators. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the 
sentence imposed by the district court for Russell's 
conspiracy conviction. We will reverse Russell's conviction 
and vacate his sentence on the CCE count, and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting: 
 
I concur in the affirmance of the defendant's conspiracy 
conviction, but I respectfully dissent from the reversal of 
his conviction for conducting a continuing criminal 
enterprise (CCE), in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 848. The 
majority reverses that conviction because of an error in the 
CCE jury instruction, viz., the omission of an instruction 
specifically advising, as our court held in United States v. 
Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810 (3d Cir. 1996) (in banc), that the 
jurors were required to agree unanimously on the three 
CCE predicates that the defendant committed. Unlike the 
majority, I do not think that the defendant's trial counsel 
objected to this omission, as Rule 30 of the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure demands. I therefore believe that the 
question before us in this appeal is whether the challenged 
omission constituted "plain error" (Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)), 
and I do not think that the demanding test for "plain error" 
is met here. 
 
1. Before discussing defense counsel's failure to object to 
the instruction in question, I think that it may be helpful to 
provide some background regarding the unanimity 
requirement that is involved in this appeal. In order to be 
convicted under 21 U.S.C. S 848 for conducting a 
continuing criminal enterprise, a defendant must have 
committed a felony violation of the federal drug laws, and 
this violation must be "a part of a continuing series" of 
such violations. In United States v. Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 
642 (3d Cir. 1988), a panel of our court held that a "series" 
in this context means at least three violations. Id. The panel 
further held that the jury must agree unanimously on the 
three violations that are used to support a CCE conviction 
and that a trial judge must, on request, give a jury 
instruction specifically setting out this unanimity 
instruction. Id. at 642-43. 
 
In Edmonds, a later CCE prosecution, the district court 
refused to give such an instruction, and a panel of our 
court held that this refusal required reversal. In a 
concurring opinion, Judge Hutchinson observed that, if the 
panel had not been bound by Echeverri, he would have 
been "inclined to follow the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit 
in United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 947-948 (7th Cir. 
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1991), cert. denied, [503 U.S. 996 and cert. denied, 504 
U.S. 910 (1992)]," which held that the jurors in a CCE case 
need not agree unanimously on the particular CCE 
predicates. Slip op. at 26 (Hutchinson, J., concurring). 
Similarly, Judge Garth, in concurrence, stated that he 
"shar[ed] Judge Hutchinson's concerns regarding the 
Echeverri doctrine." Slip op. at 28 (Garth, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). He added that he perceived 
"conceptual tension" between Echeverri and our court's 
decision in United States v. Jackson, 879 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 
1989), in which we held that jurors need not agree 
unanimously on the identities of the five or more persons 
that a CCE defendant organized, supervised, or managed. 
Slip op. at 28 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). Judge Garth suggested that this tension"call[ed] 
for further resolution." Id. 
 
The panel opinion in Edmonds was filed on April 18, 
1995, and Russell's trial commenced a few weeks later, on 
June 5, 1995. On June 29, 1995, during the course of that 
trial, the government's petition for rehearing in banc in 
Edmonds was granted and the panel opinion was vacated. 
Russell's jury was instructed on July 12, 1995 -- after 
Edmonds was listed for rehearing in banc and well before 
that case was reargued (October 25, 1995) and the in banc 
decision was handed down (April 4, 1996). 
 
In Edmonds, the full court held, by a narrow vote, that 
the CCE statute requires that jurors agree unanimously on 
the particular CCE predicates. The court further held that 
the district court's refusal to give a specific unanimity 
instruction was erroneous but that the error was harmless. 
For the reasons set out in my concurring opinion and 
Judge Garth's concurring opinion in Edmonds, I continue 
to believe that the CCE statute does not contain any such 
special unanimity instruction, but I recognize that we are 
bound to follow that holding here. 
 
2. With this background in mind, I turn to the que stion 
whether defense counsel in this case adequately objected to 
the instruction on which the majority relies. Rule 30 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent 
part as follows: 
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       No party may assign as error any portion of the charge 
       or omission therefrom unless that party objects thereto 
       before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating 
       distinctly the matter to which that party objects and 
       the grounds of the objection. 
 
This is a vitally important rule. It promotes judicial 
economy by eliminating unnecessary appeals and retrials. 
More important, because appellate reversals and retrials 
produce delay, and because delay often results in the loss 
or impairment of evidence, Rule 30 serves to promote 
accuracy in jury verdicts. As the majority points out, a 
lawyer is not required to use any special language to satisfy 
Rule 30; the lawyer must simply use words that are 
reasonably calculated to get the message across. In this 
case, however, defense counsel did not do so. 
 
After the district court judge completed his charge, he 
asked whether counsel had any objections. Supp. App. at 6.9 
Defense counsel then objected to the trial judge's failure to 
cover two instructions requested by the defense, i.e., 
number 51 and number 43. Id. at 7-8. Neither of these 
requested instructions had anything to do with the issue of 
jury unanimity regarding particular CCE predicates. After 
the district court ruled on these two matters, the following 
exchange occurred: 
 
       THE COURT: Do you have anything else? 
 
       MR. TRAVIS [defense counsel]: No, Your Honor. 
 
Id. at 9. 
 
The jury then retired to deliberate and subsequently sent 
out a note requesting "a limited reading of the Judge's 
charge as to count one [the CCE count]." App. at 2155.10 In 
response, the court proposed to read virtually the entire 
charge concerning the CCE count, and both counsel 
agreed. Id. at 2156. As a result, the district court once 
again read to the jury the portion of the charge that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. "Supp. App." refers to the Supplemental Appendix filed by the 
government. 
 
10. "App." refers to the appendix filed by the appellant. 
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defendant now challenges on appeal. The following then 
occurred: 
 
       THE COURT: ...Do you have any objection to those 
       instructions, counsel? 
 
       MR. ROCKTASHEL [the prosecutor]:  No, Your H onor. 
 
       THE COURT: Do you, sir? 
 
       MR. TRAVIS [defense counsel]:  No, Your Hono r. 
 
Id. at 2163-64. 
 
Thus, defense counsel twice told the trial judge that he 
had no objection to the jury instruction that is challenged 
in this appeal. Moreover, defense counsel never mentioned 
or referred even obliquely to Edmonds during the colloquy 
devoted to objections to the instructions. Accordingly, 
defense counsel did not, in my view, adequately convey to 
the trial judge the simple message that was necessary in 
order to comply with Rule 30, i.e., "Judge there's a mistake 
in the jury charge. It doesn't tell the jurors that they must 
agree unanimously regarding the three CCE predicates." 
 
It is true that defense counsel did subsequently mention 
Edmonds, but he did so in connection with an entirely 
different question, i.e., whether the district court should 
give the jury a special verdict sheet concerning the CCE 
predicates. Some time after the colloquy concerning the 
jury instructions, the court stated: 
 
       Now, there is one other thing, and that is ... I 
       understood you to say, Mr. Travis, that there were 
       certain specific findings that were required under 
       Count One. 
 
July 12, 1995 Tr. at 70. Defense counsel then referred to 
the panel decision in Edmonds (which, as previously noted, 
had been filed on April 18, 1995, but vacated on June 29, 
1995, when rehearing in banc was granted). Defense 
counsel stated: "[T]he impression I had was that you had to 
give [the jurors] a special verdict page where they said, 
these are the three violations ..." App. at 2143. The court 
asked: 
 
       THE COURT: Well what are you asking that we do? 
 
                                25 
  
Id. Defense counsel responded as follows: 
 
       Well I -- you asked about the form, the form of the 
       verdict and whether I thought that there was any 
       change that needed to be made. I was attempting to 
       point out that my interpretation of [Edmonds] seems to 
       suggest that there is a need for a special verdict page 
       that requires the jury to fill in three blank lines of 
       which three federal felony offenses they have 
       unanimously agreed upon having been committed by 
       the Defendant, if they agree on that element. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). The district court judge said that he 
would read the Edmonds panel opinion, but he observed 
that he thought that "there's a general reluctance on the 
Court of Appeals to require any special verdict forms in 
criminal cases." App. at 2144. Later, the court decided not 
to give the jury a special verdict sheet, and the defendant 
does not challenge that decision on appeal. 
 
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that defense 
counsel, by requesting a special verdict sheet, adequately 
conveyed to the district court the message that the court's 
jury instruction was inconsistent with the Edmonds panel 
decision. As noted, defense counsel, by this point, had 
twice failed to object to the challenged jury instructions, 
and when defense counsel finally mentioned Edmonds and 
the trial judge pointedly asked, "Well, what are you asking 
that we do" (App. at 2143), defense counsel's only request 
was that the court give the jury a special verdict sheet. Id. 
 
In my view, the question whether a trial judge is required 
to give a special instruction on jury unanimity in a CCE 
case is separate from the question whether a trial judge is 
required to use a special verdict sheet. Although the 
Edmonds panel and in banc decisions held that it is error 
to decline to give a special jury unanimity instruction when 
one is requested, neither the Edmonds panel opinion nor 
the Edmonds in banc opinion requires a special verdict 
sheet. On the contrary, we have held that, as a general 
matter, a district court "has discretion in determining 
whether to submit special interrogatories to the jury 
regarding the elements of an offense." United States v. 
Console, 13 F.3d 641, 663 & n.23 (3d Cir. 1993). By 
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obscuring the important distinction between an objection to 
a jury instruction and a request for a special verdict sheet, 
the majority, I believe, has committed a serious error. 
 
In addition to relying on defense counsel's request for a 
special verdict sheet, the majority also relies on the 
defendant's proposed jury instruction number 41, which 
stated in pertinent part that the jury was required to "agree 
unanimously on the three acts which constitute the 
continuing series of Federal Drug Law violations." See Maj. 
Op. at 12 n.7 (quoting Supp. App. 25). If defense counsel 
had objected to the court's charge on the ground that it 
failed to cover this point, and if the district court had 
nevertheless declined to cover that point, then this case 
would be indistinguishable from Edmonds, and I would join 
the majority in voting to reverse. However, that is not what 
occurred. After the district court completed its jury 
instructions and asked defense counsel whether he had 
any objections, defense counsel referred to the 93 pages of 
proposed instructions that he had submitted and asked 
whether he could assume that any instruction that had not 
been given should be "deemed denied." Supp. App. at 6. 
The court rejected this suggestion and instructed defense 
counsel to assert any objections he had to the instructions 
that the court had given. Id. Then, as previously noted, 
defense counsel argued that the court had erred in failing 
to cover two of the requested defense instructions, i.e., 
numbers 51 and 43. Id. at 7-8. Defense counsel made no 
reference to instruction number 41, and therefore it seems 
to me that, simply by including that instruction in the large 
packet of requested defense instructions, the defense did 
not fulfil its obligation under Rule 30 to assert an objection 
to the court's instructions and state "distinctly the matter 
to which th[e] party objects and the grounds of the 
objection." 
 
For these reasons, I would hold that defense counsel did 
not adequately object at trial to the jury instruction that is 
now challenged on appeal. Consequently, I believe that our 
review is limited to determining whether the district court's 
instruction constituted "plain error." Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). 
 
3. As noted, the in banc court held in Edmonds that, in 
order to find a defendant guilty under the CCE statute, 21 
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U.S.C. S 848, a jury must unanimously agree that the same 
three related predicate offenses occurred. The court further 
held that the district court in that case erred in rejecting a 
defense request for an instruction specifically advising the 
jurors that they were required to agree unanimously on 
which three related violations occurred. 
 
The instruction challenged in this case did not 
affirmatively mistake the law, as interpreted in Edmonds. 
The instruction did not advise, contrary to Edmonds, that 
it was unnecessary for the jurors to agree unanimously 
regarding the three CCE predicate offenses that occurred. 
In the challenged instruction, the district court stated: 
 
       The phrase, a continuing series of violations means 
       three or more violations of the federal narcotics laws 
       which are in some way -- laws which are in some way 
       related to each other. In order to find that this element 
       has been established, you must unanimously agree that 
       the Defendant, Mr. Russell, participated in some way in 
       at least three or more violations of the federal narcotics 
       laws which are in some way related to each other. 
 
App. at 2094. See also App. at 2158-59. As far as it went, 
this instruction was entirely accurate: in order for the jury 
to find that Russell violated 21 U.S.C. S 848, it was 
necessary that they "unanimously agree that . . . Mr. 
Russell participated in some way in at least three or more 
violations of the federal narcotics laws which are in some 
way related to each other." App. at 2094. The problem with 
this instruction is not that it was inaccurate but that it was 
incomplete: it did not go on and explain to the jurors that 
they were required, not only to agree unanimously that 
Russell committed three CCE predicates, but to agree 
unanimously with respect to the three particular predicates 
that he committed. 
 
In my view, this failure to provide the jury with a more 
complete and specific explanation of the unanimity 
requirement in a CCE case does not amount to "plain 
error." In United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), the 
Supreme Court held that, in order for an appellate court to 
find plain error, it must first find 1) an error 2) that is plain 
and 3) that affects substantial rights. Even if all three of 
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these prerequisites are met, an appellate court may correct 
an error to which no objection was made "only if (4) the 
error `seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.' " Johnson v. United 
States, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997) (quoting Olano, 507 
U.S. at 732) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Here, I agree that the first of these four requirements 
(there was an error) was met. But I do not believe that the 
second requirement (the error was "plain") was satisfied, 
and therefore I need not consider the third or fourth 
requirement. 
 
" `Plain' is synonymous with `clear' or, equivalently, 
`obvious.' " United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. As we 
have explained: 
 
       To find plain error, the mistake must be sufficiently 
       obvious that "the trial judge and prosecutor were 
       derelict in countenancing it, even absent the 
       defendant's timely assistance in detecting it." 
 
Government of Virgin Islands v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 632 
(1993) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 
(1982)). In my view, the omission in this case was not 
"sufficiently obvious that `the trial judge and prosecutor 
were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the 
defendant's timely assistance in detecting it.' " Knight, 983 
F.2d at 632 (quoting Frady, 456 U.S. at 163). The omission 
was simply a mistake, the sort of mistake that would have 
constituted reversible error had defense counsel called it to 
the trial judge's attention as required by Rule 30, but a 
mistake that falls short of constituting "plain error." "The 
Supreme Court has admonished courts of appeals to 
characterize a mistake as plain error `sparingly, solely in 
those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice 
would otherwise result.' " Knight, 989 F.2d at 631 (quoting 
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985). "Reviewing 
courts are not to use the plain-error doctrine to consider 
trial court errors not meriting appellate review absent 
timely objection." United States v. Young, 470 U.S. at 16. 
That, in my judgment, is what the majority has done here. 
For that reason, I dissent from the reversal of the 
defendant's CCE conviction. 
 
                                29 
  
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                30 
 
